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States Are Eroding At-Will Employment Doctrines:
Will Pennsylvania Join the Crowd?
I. INTRODUCTION
Russian author Leo Tolstoy once remarked that "[w]ork is the
inevitable condition of human life, the true source of human wel-
fare."' Indeed, these words have transcended time. Work remains
a basic element of human existence and a necessity for continued
subsistence. In fact, the importance of work has been recognized
for centuries. Even the Bible observes that a man who will not
work will not eat.2
However, despite the on-going significance of work, people living
in the United States have the right to choose whether to work, as
well as the right to decide whether to remain or depart from a par-
ticular work environment. Likewise, employers have the right to
choose whether to retain or terminate an employee. Ideally, these
choices are made available to employees and employers when ju-
risdictions abide by and enforce the at-will employment doctrine.3
This doctrine enables an employer or employee, in the absence of a
contract to the contrary, to end the employment relationship at
any time, with or without notice, for any or no particular reason.
Despite the traditional rule of at-will employment, more and
more jurisdictions are beginning to erode this doctrine by carving
out exceptions that restrict an employer's ability to freely termi-
nate an employee without fear of liability.5 Particularly, and per-
haps most restrictive of the employer's unbridled right to termi-
nate, courts are recognizing an implied-in-fact contract exception
to the at-will rule.6 Additionally, courts have allowed the pre-
1. THE HARPER BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 490 (Robert I. Fitzhenry ed., Harper Collins
Books 3d ed. 1993).
2. 2 Thessalonians 3:10.
3. For instance, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958) classifies at-will
employment as follows: "Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent
to employ and serve create obligations to employ and serve which are terminable upon
notice by either party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate by
lapse of time or by supervening events." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958).
4. Id.
5. See Todd M. Shaughnessy, Johnson v. Morton Thiokol and Handbook Disclaimers:
Allowing Employers to Have Their Cake and Eat It Too, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1065 (1992).
6. See Kurt H. Decker, Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law's Extension to Private Sector
Employees: Has the Time Finally Come to Broaden Statutory Protection for All At-Will
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sumption of at-will employment to be overcome by express agree-
ment,7 public policy, and statutory exceptions.8
Unlike other states, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, at least
for now, assures that Pennsylvania firmly adheres to the pre-
sumption of at-will employment.9 However, Pennsylvania courts
have already taken measures to start the gradual erosion of the
doctrine. As more and more jurisdictions depart from the at-will
employment doctrine, whether Pennsylvania will completely fol-
low suit is an open question.
This comment chronicles the development of the at-will em-
ployment doctrine, in both the United States and Pennsylvania,
and details the various exceptions recognized by both Pennsyl-
vania and her sister states. Additionally, it explains how other
select jurisdictions have sounded the death-knell for the at-will
rule, and it focuses on what Pennsylvania must do to avoid follow-
ing suit.
II. HISTORY OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
A. United States
The at-will employment doctrine first materialized in the
United States by means of an 1871 treatise authored by Horace
Gray Wood."° Although early American courts adopted the Eng-
lish common law approach that all hirings were presumed to last
Employees?, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 723 n.33 (2000) (citing Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.
App. 3d 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the presumption that an employment rela-
tionship is terminable at-will can be overcome by contrary evidence, such as an express or
implied agreement, that employment will continue for a certain length of time; oral promise
is enforceable where employer had history of terminating only for just cause); Bower v.
AT&T Tech., Inc., 852 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that laid-off employees could bring
an action against their employer for compensatory damages for breaking a promise of re-
employment after a corporate restructuring); and Panto v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 547
A.2d 260 (N.H. 1988) (holding that a promise by the employer to continue salary, pension,
and insurance benefits following possible layoffs might be an enforceable unilateral con-
tract)).
7. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1974) and Guz v.
Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 (Cal. 2000).
8. See Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1421 et seq. (1986);
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal. 1980) (holding that an em-
ployee cannot be terminated by his employer for reporting public policy violations by the
employer); and Phillips v. St. Mary Reg'l Medical Ctr., 96 Cal. App. 4th 218 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that statutory exceptions include legislation such as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which specifically precludes termination at-will where such termination
is based on protected status such as race or ethnicity).
9. See McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283 (Pa. 2000).
10. See, HORACE GRAY WOOD, LAW OF MASTER & SERVANT, 277 (1877).
At-Will Employment
for one year, Wood, without basis, argued that American courts
should instead follow an at-will presumption. 1 In fact, Wood cited
four cases as authority for his position, but none supported his
theory. 2 Even though Wood offered no critical analysis for the at-
will employment doctrine, by the late eighteen hundreds and early
nineteen hundreds, most courts embraced Wood's formulation of
the at-will presumption. 13
Many legal scholars have suggested the at-will employment doc-
trine was so widely accepted because it fit with the prevailing lais-
sez-faire economic climate of the era. 4 During the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, big business and industry ruled,
laws were fashioned to promote industrial growth, and courts
sided with powerful businessmen over employees. Thus, the at-
will presumption flourished since it preserves managerial discre-
tion in the work environment.'6 Specifically, the at-will employ-
ment doctrine embraces freedom of contract principles, which
played a key role in developing the free enterprise system.
17
However, in subsequent decades, courts around the nation be-
gan to acknowledge the vast disparity in power between employ-
ers and their employees, and reckoned that the at-will employ-
ment doctrine gave significant leverage to employers. 8 Thus, in
an effort to protect employees and level the playing field, courts,
along with legislatures, created judicial and statutory exceptions
for wrongful termination, such as implied covenants of good faith
and fair dealing, public policy exceptions, and implied-in-fact con-
tract exceptions.' 9
Though these exceptions have eroded the at-will employment
doctrine to varying degrees among the nation's jurisdictions, the
doctrine still endures in the United States today. Only one state,
11. See Decker, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 731 n.23 (2000). See also Justin R. Olsen, The Course
of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Utah: Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.-A Turning of
the Tide, 5 BYU J. PUB. L. 249, 250-51 (1991).
12. See Olsen, supra note 11, at 251. The four cases that Wood cited are as follows:
Wilder's Case, 5 Ct.Cl. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Wilder,
80 U.S. 254 (1874); De Briar v. Minturn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co.,
106 Mass. 56 (1870); and Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
13. See Decker, supra note 6, at n.23.
14. Id. at 731.
15. Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (overruled
on other grounds).
16. Darlington, 540 A.2d at 309.
17. Id.
18. See Decker, supra note 6, at 733.
19. Id. at 733-34.
Spring 2004 513
Duquesne Law Review
through legislative measures, has completely eliminated the pre-
sumption of at-will employment.2 °
B. Pennsylvania
In the late nineteenth century, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court first addressed the issue of at-will employment in Henry v.
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Company.2 As the first judicial
interpretation of the at-will doctrine in Pennsylvania, the court
held that an employer could terminate an employee with or with-
out cause, for good reason or no reason, unless the parties had
agreed to a contract that stated otherwise.22
1. The Public Policy Exception
The at-will rule announced in Henry remained untouched until
1974, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Geary v.
United States Steel Corporation.23  Geary involved a discharge
based on an employee's report to his superiors concerning the un-
safe nature of the steel pipe manufactured and sold by the com-
pany.24 Although the court ultimately concluded that the em-
ployee did not set forth a cause of action, the court, in dicta, left
open the possibility of a public policy exception to the doctrine of
employment at-will.25 For instance, the court considered that in
certain circumstances, an employee may have a claim for wrongful
discharge when his termination would violate a "clear mandate of
public policy." 26 The Geary court cautioned that the legislature is
the most appropriate branch of government to create exceptions to
the at-will rule.27  However, subsequent court decisions have in-
terpreted Geary as creating the first common law exception, the
public policy exception, to the at-will doctrine.28
20. Id. at 734 n.37 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-902 to 39-2-914 (1998)). Montana
was the first state to deviate from the at-will presumption by creating a statute designed to
protect at-will employees from wrongful termination. See Decker, supra note 6, at 764.
21. 21 A. 157 (Pa. 1891).
22. Henry, 21 A. at 157.
23. 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
24. Geary, 319 A.2d at 175.
25. Id. at 180.
26. Id.
27. Id.




Approximately a decade and a half later, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court expanded its Geary decision in Clay v. Advanced
Computer Applications, Inc.29 Justice Flaherty stated the follow-
ing:
It should be noted that as a general rule, there is no common
law cause of action against an employer for termination of an
at-will employment relationship. Exceptions to this rule have
been recognized in only the most limited of circumstances,
where discharges of at-will employees would threaten clear
mandates of public policy.3"
Subsequently, in Paul v. Lankenau Hospital," the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court announced that while Geary, as reinforced by
Clay, acknowledged that some exceptions to the at-will employ-
ment rule exist, the judiciary, however, should not conclusively
define the boundaries of such exceptions.32 Further, the Supreme
Court also approved of Chief Justice Nix's concurrence in Clay, in
which he stated that there was no common law cause of action for
wrongful discharge.33 Overall, the court held that "in the absence
of a legally cognizable cause of action, the trial court erred in sub-
mitting the issue to the jury."' Although the Supreme Court in
Paul and Clay determined that no cause of action for wrongful
discharge had been stated, the Court left the door open for a pub-
lic policy claim to be brought in Pennsylvania.
Since the Geary line of cases, lower Pennsylvania courts have
experienced difficulty in determining what constitutes a valid pub-
lic policy interest sufficient to overcome the presumption of at-will
employment.35 Courts have utilized the public policy exception in
instances where an employer: 1) terminated an employee for serv-
ing jury duty;3  2) abstained from hiring a potential employee who
did not disclose a pardoned conviction;" 3) discharged an employee
for reporting the employer's failure to comply with federal nuclear
regulations;38 and 4) fired an employee in retaliation for filing a
29. 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989).
30. Clay, 559 A.2d at 918 (citations omitted).
31. 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990).
32. See Paul, 569 A.2d at 348 (quoting Geary, 319 A.2d at 180).
33. Id. (citing Clay, 559 A.2d at 923 (Nix, J., concurring)).
34. Id. at 348-49.
35. See Decker, supra note 6, at 736.
36. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
37. See Hunter v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
38. See Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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workers' compensation claim.39 In these cases, the courts have not
specified what exactly constitutes "public policy," but they have
noted in cases outside of the wrongful termination arena that
"public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and le-
gal precedents and not from supposed public interest.'"°
In general, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that it de-
cides what constitutes public policy in Pennsylvania by looking at
Pennsylvania case law, the Pennsylvania Constitution, and legis-
lative statutes.4' In fact, in all of the cases in which the courts
have found public policy violations, they have grounded their deci-
sions on statutory provisions or case law to justify the application
of the public policy exception.42 Overall, Pennsylvania courts are
very reluctant to employ the public policy exception, and thus,
they reserve it for the very narrowest of circumstances."
2. Statutory Exceptions
Like many other jurisdictions, Pennsylvania courts allow em-
ployees to overcome the presumption of at-will employment by
grounding their claims in federal statutory law." In fact, even if a
state abides by the at-will doctrine, numerous federal statutes al-
ready prevent an employer from exercising his right to terminate
at-will.45 Federal statutory exceptions include legislation such as
the Civil Rights Act of 196446 and the National Labor Relations
Act.
47
39. See Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998).
40. Shick , 716 A.2d at 1237 (quoting Hall v. Amica Mutual Ins. Company, 648 A.2d
755, 760 (Pa. 1994)).
41. .McLaughlin, 750 A.2d at 288.
42. See Decker, supra note 6, at 736-37.
43. Id. at 737.
44. See McLaughlin, 750 A-2d at 288.
45. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 376 n.4 (Cal. 1988).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3(a) (1964) (precludes termination at-will where such
termination is based on protected status such as race or ethnicity).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), and (4) (1988) (prohibits discharge for engaging in union
activity, protected concerted activity and for filing charges and testifying under the Act).
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In addition to federal statutory exceptions, numerous states
have also carved out their own statutory protections for employ-
ees. 8 In 1986, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Pennsyl-
vania Whistleblower Law (hereinafter "the Whistleblower Law" or
"the Law").49 The purpose of the Whistleblower Law, as expressed
in the its Historical and Statutory Notes, is to provide a safe-
harbor for employees who report an actual or suspected violation
of federal, state, or local law.5"
Specifically, the Whistleblower Law provides that an employer
may not interfere with the "employee's compensation, terms, con-
ditions, location or privileges of employment because the employee
or a person acting on behalf of the employee makes a good faith
report or is about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer
or appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste." 1
Additionally, the judiciary has great flexibility in calculating em-
ployee remedies under the Whistleblower Law because it can re-
quire the employer to reinstate the employee, or can order back-
pay, restoration of seniority rights and fringe benefits, actual
damages, or a combination of all of these awards, to make the em-
ployee whole." On the flip side, the court also can impose a vari-
ety of penalties on those who violate the Whistleblower Law.53 For
instance, the court can order the violator to pay a civil fine of not
more than five hundred dollars or suspend a person who works for
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or a political subdivision
thereof, for a period of no more than six months."
The Whistleblower Law does not expressly state whether its
coverage extends solely to public sector employees, or if it can also
extend to private sector employees in certain situations.5 Before
1998, courts interpreted the Law to only apply to public employees
who, acting in good faith, notified the appropriate authorities in
instances where their employers engaged in improper conduct or
48. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 376 n.4.
49. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1421-1428 (2003).
50. Decker, supra note 6, at 743.
51. Id. at 744 (citing Whistleblower Law, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1421-1428 (2003)).
52. Decker, supra note 6, at 749.
53. Id. at 750.
54. Id. However, a court's ability to order suspension, as a penalty for violating the
Whistleblower Law, does not extend to persons who hold public office. Id.
55. Decker, supra note 6, at 743.
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committed waste.56 For example, in the 1993 case of Krajsa v.
Keypunch, Inc. ," the Pennsylvania Superior Court noted that the
Whistleblower Law only extends to employees terminated from
governmental entities or other bodies that were created by or re-
ceived funding from the government.58 In fact, the court specifi-
cally rationalized that the legislature restricted the language of
the Law to encompass only the public sector in order to avoid the
millions of private sector employers and employees from drowning
the courts in a flood of litigation.59
However, five years later, in Riggio v. Burns, ° the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, sitting en banc, widened the scope of the Whistle-
blower Law to cover the private sector in situations where a pri-
vate sector employee could demonstrate that he received public
monies and acted as an agent to a public body." Since the Law
defines "employee" as "[a] person who performs a service for wages
or other remuneration under a contract of hire . . . for a public
body," 2 the court observed that it must first decide whether a pri-
vate sector employee fits into the definition of "public body."63 The
court determined that since the Law classifies any body "funded in
any manner by or through Commonwealth .. .authority"6 as a
public body, the employer fit the definition because it received
state appropriations. 5
In the aftermath of Riggio, subsequent Pennsylvania Superior
Court decisions have reaffirmed the applicability of the Whistle-
blower Law to the private sector.66 In Denton v. Silver Stream
56. Id. at 750.
57. 622 A.2d 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
58. Krajsa, 622 A.2d at 360 (citing Cohen v. Salick Health Care, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1521
(E.D. Pa. 1991)). In Krajsa, the Court held that the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law did
not cover an at-will employee's termination from a company that performed government
contracts. 622 A.2d at 360. Rather, the Law only protects employees discharged from
governmental entities or other entities created or funded by government. Id. at 360.
59. Krajsa, 622 A.2d at 360.
60. 711 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).
61. Decker, supra note 6, at 750 (discussing Riggio v. Burns, 711 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1998)).
62. Whistleblower Law, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1422 (2003).
63. Decker, supra note 6, at 751.
64. Whistleblower Law, 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1422 (2003).
65. Decker, supra note 6, at 752-53.
66. Id. at 753 (discussing Denton infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text).
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Nursing and Rehabilitation Center,67 the Superior Court clarified
that the Whistleblower Law pertains to entities that receive both
money provided for by the Commonwealth and public money that
is siphoned through the Commonwealth by the federal govern-
ment.
68
Overall, within the last half-decade, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court has applied the Whistleblower Law to any private entity
that fits the definition of a public body.69 Thus, hospitals, nursing
and personal care homes, facilities for the mentally disabled, insti-
tutions for the mentally incompetent, and numerous health care
providers all fall within the scope of the Law due to their receipt of
governmental funding. ° Additionally, based on court decisions,
the Law protects an employee who labors for any other private
sector employer, contractor, or person who works with a public
body, such as a contractor that does public works projects or an
individual that makes sales to public bodies.7
The Pennsylvania Superior Court's recent expansion of the per-
sons covered by the Whistleblower Law has led critics to comment
that the judiciary has broadened the Law to its fullest extent by
statutorily abolishing a portion of the at-will employment doc-
trine." For instance, practically all private and public sector
whistleblowers can resort to the Whistleblower Law to prevent
their employers from terminating them at-will.
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adamantly main-
tains that Pennsylvania adheres to the at-will rule,73 and though
Pennsylvania courts only sparingly apply the public policy excep-
tions, the judiciary has greatly modified the at-will doctrine
through statutory exceptions and must monitor this area more
carefully in the future in order to prevent continual erosion.
3. The Implied-In-Fact Contract Exception
Many jurisdictions have deviated from the at-will employment
doctrine by means of the implied-in-fact contract exception. Penn-
sylvania has remained very cautious about allowing employees to
prevail under this exception, though Pennsylvania courts have
67. 739 A-2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
68. Decker, supra note 6, at 753.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 753-54.
71. Decker, supra note 6, at 754.
72. Id.
73. See McLaughlin, 750 A.2d at 287.
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sometimes struggled in determining what factors or combination
of factors are necessary to create an implied-in-fact contract.
As a general matter, Pennsylvania does recognize this excep-
tion. In Veno v. Meredith, III 4 the Pennsylvania Superior Court
noted that though the simplest way for parties to rebut the at-will
employment doctrine is by forming an express contract, the par-
ties can also defeat the presumption through an implied contract. 5
Specifically, all of the surrounding circumstances of the hiring
may demonstrate that the parties wanted to enter into a for cause
employment relationship. 6 For example, in another much earlier
case, Lucacher v. Kerson,77 the Pennsylvania Superior Court ex-
plained that when interpreting a contract to ascertain the inten-
tion of the parties, the judiciary may consider the totality of the
circumstances, the situation of the parties, the objects they appar-
ently had in mind, and the nature and subject matter of the
agreement.78 However, the Veno court cautioned that in order to
contract-away the at-will rule, the parties must express their in-
tentions with extreme clarity.79
Given this standard, the employee in Veno could not overcome
the presumption of at-will employment. Although he argued that
upon his hiring, his employer told him that they would retire to-
gether, and though he turned down other job opportunities
throughout the course of his employment, the court stated that
despite the "aspirational quality" of the statements, "[t]he law
does not attach binding significance to comments which merely
evince an employer's hope that the employee will remain in his
employ until retirement." Further, the court did not find merit
in the employee's decision to forego other prospective employment
opportunities, and reckoned that "[t]his forebearance [sic] was
merely a manifestation of his preference to remain with the Free
Press and in no way suggests he had the reasonable belief that he
could never be fired except for just cause."81
In Luteran v. Loral Fairchild Corp.,82 a case similar to Veno, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court acknowledged that an employee may
74. 515 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
75. Veno, 515 A.2d at 577.
76. Id.
77. 45 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946).
78. Lucacher, 45 A.2d at 247.
79. Veno, 515 A.2d at 578.
80. Id. at 579.
81. Id. at 579-80 (internal citations omitted).
82. 688 A.2d 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
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rebut the at-will presumption by proving: "1) an agreement for a
definite duration; 2) an agreement specifying that the employee
will be discharged for just cause only; 3) sufficient additional con-
sideration; or 4) an applicable recognized public policy exception." 3
The court went on to explain that when a litigant bases his claim
on an implied contract argument, he will only be able to have a
jury hear his case if he can clearly demonstrate that he and his
employer intended to create a contract.8
The employee in Luteran did not succeed in rebutting the pre-
sumption of at-will employment.85 He attempted to prove that he
and his employer formed an implied-in-fact contract due to clear
and unequivocal language in an employee handbook that stated
that he could only be fired for just cause, but the court disagreed.86
To justify this decision, the court explained that a handbook is
only enforceable against an employer "if a reasonable person in
the employee's position would interpret its provisions as evidenc-
ing the employer's intent to supplant the at-will rule and be bound
legally by its representations in the handbook."7 The court went
on to emphasize that "[t]he handbook must contain a clear indica-
tion that the employer intended to overcome the at-will presump-
tion."88
Determining whether the employer intended to create a for
cause relationship by means of an employee handbook is the re-
sponsibility of the court.89 Because the court must carefully focus
on the parties' clearly specified intentions, the court should not
simply assume that the employer wanted to create legal ramifica-
tions upon distributing an employee handbook or that the em-
ployee believed that the handbook legally bound his employer. °
Given these guidelines, the Luteran court concluded that the
employer did not intend to form a for cause relationship with his
employee by distributing the handbook.91 The court based its deci-
sion on the fact that the handbook did nothing more than state
logical examples of actions that any reasonable employee would
83. Luteran, 688 A.2d at 214 (internal citation omitted).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 217.
86. Id. at 214.
87. Id.
88. Luteran, 688 A.2d at 214.
89. Id. at 214-15.




understand as being grounds for termination.92 Further, the
handbook expressly stated that the enumerated list of actions was
illustrative only and was created solely for informational pur-
poses.93 Additionally, by referring to its previous decision in Mar-
tin, the court disagreed with the employee's argument that his
employer intended a for cause relationship because the handbook
expressly mentioned the term "discharge for just cause."94 In Mar-
tin, the court specifically held that use of the term "just cause"
does not automatically transform an employment handbook into a
contract.9" In order to make a handbook a binding employment
contract, the employer must clearly state that intention.96 The
handbook did not contain express language indicating that it was
to be a legally binding contract.97 Therefore, the Luteran court
held that the employer did not intend to limit the employment re-
lationship to just cause terminations.98
Similarly to Luteran, the United States District Court, in
Trefsgar v. Contributors to the Pennsylvania Hospital,99 held that
the healthcare clinic employee did not present sufficient evidence
to overcome the at-will presumption by means of an implied-in-
fact contract.' °° In this case, the defendant supervisor "repeatedly
and emphatically" promised to retain employee Trefsgar, but
shortly thereafter, the supervisor terminated her as part of a re-
duction in staff.' Ms. Trefsgar claimed that because her em-
ployer provided continual assurances of job security, they entered
into an implied contract of employment that the clinic breached by
discharging her.' Additionally, she argued that she provided
"additional consideration" to her employer, sufficient to create an
implied employment contract, by reassuring the clinic's clients
that she would continue working at the clinic during an ownership
transition period.' 3
The court responded to the arguments by first stating that an
employee can overcome the at-will rule "by, inter alia, establishing
92. Id.
93. Luteran, 688 A.2d at 215.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 216.
98. Luteran, 688 A.2d at 216.
99. 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5486 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
100. Trefsgar, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5486, at *15.
101. Id. at *3.




that the parties either expressly or impliedly formed an employ-
ment contract for a definite duration, or by establishing that suffi-
cient 'additional consideration' passed from the employee to the
employer to form an implied contract.""4 The court went on to ex-
plain that in order to form an implied contract, the employee must
allege that her employer made her an intentional and definite of-
fer of employment. 15
Applying these principles, the court ruled that although the em-
ployer "repeatedly and emphatically" told Ms. Trefsgar not to
worry about losing her job, these assurances were too vague to
form an implied contract.0 6 The United States District Court, re-
lying on a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, held that "[t]here
must be an intended, definite, specific offer before any offer can be
accepted or any enforceable contract created.""7 The court rea-
soned that "[i]f assurances of 'lifetime' and 'permanent' employ-
ment are too vague, an assurance of 'secure' employment is also
too vague, as it is no more definite in its terms.""8
Additionally, the court disagreed with Ms. Trefsgar's assertion
that she gave her employer sufficient additional consideration to
defeat the at-will rule."9 The court acknowledged that the parties
may alter an at-will relationship if "an employee affords his em-
ployer a substantial benefit other than the services which the em-
ployee is hired to perform, or when the employee undergoes a sub-
stantial hardship other than the services which he is hired to per-
form," but the court decided that Ms. Trefsgar could not overcome
the at-will doctrine by means of the additional consideration the-
ory." ' Specifically, the court held that her employer instructed her
to reassure the clinic's clients that she would remain the medical
administrator during the switch in ownership, and therefore, Ms.
Trefsgar was merely carrying out her employment responsibilities
by complying with what she was initially hired to do."'
104. Id. at *7 (citations omitted).
105. Trefsgar, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5486, at 7 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at *9-10.
107. Id. at *10 (citing Morosetti v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 564 A.2d 151, 153
(Pa. 1989)).
108. Id. at *10.
109. Id. at *11.
110. Trefsgar, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5486, at *11 (citing Stumpp, 658 A.2d at 335).
111. Id. at *12.
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The implied-in-fact contract theory, formed on the basis of suffi-
cient additional consideration, can markedly infringe on an em-
ployer's right to terminate. In fact, when an employee gives
proper additional consideration, this should result in a finding
that the "employee should not be subject to discharge without just
cause for a reasonable time." 2 A "reasonable time" has been in-
terpreted as a period of time that is "commensurate with the
hardship the employee has endured or the benefit he has be-
stowed.""' As a result of these standards, Pennsylvania courts
only hold that an employee has provided sufficient additional con-
sideration in very limited contexts.
As observed by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Scott v. Ex-
tracorporeal, Inc.,"' sufficient additional consideration is present if
"the employee bestows a legally sufficient benefit or incurs a suffi-
cient detriment for the benefit of the employer beyond the services
for which he was hired.. ."15 However, the Scott court cautioned
that "[t]he at-will presumption is not overcome every time a
worker sacrifices theoretical rights and privileges.""6 For exam-
ple, in Shaffer v. BNP/ Cooper Neff, Inc.,"' the United States Dis-
trict Court, applying Pennsylvania law, held that the employee
(Mr. Shaffer) did not transform his employment relationship from
at-will to one that must be continued for a reasonable time.18
In Shaffer, the U.S. District Court began its analysis by noting
that the employee plaintiff bears the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that the parties intended to form a con-
tract that would last for a definite term."9 In an effort to meet
this burden, Mr. Shaffer argued that he provided his employer
with additional consideration that extended beyond simple job
performance by enduring the "self-evident hardship" of moving
from Chicago to Singapore for his employer's benefit.'
In considering Mr. Shaffer's claim, the court cited cases in
which adequate consideration was found, and explained the vari-
112. Veno, 515 A.2d at 580.
113. Id.
114. 545 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
115. Scott, 545 A.2d at 336.
116. Id. at 339.
117. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
118. Shaffer, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013, at *21-22.
119. Id. at *12.
120. Id. at *17. Before even discussing compensation, benefits, or length of employment
with his employer, Mr. Shaffer moved to Singapore on January 8, 1996, to lead a new prac-
tice group. Id. at *4. However, within 6 months, BNP/CN terminated Mr. Shaffer's em-
ployment, allegedly due to business reasons. Id. at *5-6.
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ous factors that justified these pro-employee decisions."' The
court referenced that a very useful factor in determining adequate
consideration is to question whether "a termination of the relation
by one party will result in great hardship or loss to the other, as
they must have known it would when they made the contract.
1 22
Additionally, the court emphasized that the chief factor to con-
sider is relocation, especially the relocation of a family.123  The
court referenced Cashdollar v. Mercy Hospital, in which sufficient
additional consideration was found because an employee, due to
prodding by his employer, sold his home and moved from Virginia
to Pennsylvania, along with his pregnant wife and young child.
1 24
The court noted that relocation factors include the employee's sale
of a house, especially if sold at a loss; the decision to accept a
lower salary; and the rejection of other specific opportunities.'25
Despite the court's ease in readily identifying factors for judicial
consideration, the court then provided a list of seemingly contra-
dictory cases that illustrated the difficult application of these fac-
tors. For example, though the Pennsylvania Superior Court in
Cashdollar held that an employee provided sufficient, adequate
consideration when he sold his house and moved his wife and child
to a different state at his employer's persistent requests; nearly
five years earlier the same court held the exact the opposite in
Veno v. Meredith, 111,126 a case with very similar facts. 27 As previ-
ously discussed, in Veno, the employee resigned from another job,
relocated his family from Newark, New Jersey to Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and rejected other employment offers in order to
take a position with his employer.'28 The only way to reconcile this
apparent contradiction lies in the period of time that the employ-
ees worked at their new locations before being discharged by their
employers. In Veno, the employee worked for eight years in the
new location before facing termination, whereas, in Cashdollar,
121. Id. at *17-22.
122. Id. at *18-19 (quoting Darlington, 504 A-2d 306, 315 (overruled on other grounds)).
123. Shaffer, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013, at *19 (citations omitted).
124. Id. at *18 (citing Cashdollar, 595 A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)). In Cashdollar,
the court found for the employee since his employer discharged him only 16 days after the
move. Cashdollar, 595 A.2d at 72.
125. Shaffer, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013, at *19.
126. See supra notes 74-76, 79-81, and accompanying text.
127. Shaffer, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013, at *19-20 (citing Cashdollar, 595 A.2d at 72,
and Veno, 515 A.2d at 580).
128. Veno, 515 A.2d at 580.
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the employee was fired after working only sixteen days.129  The
Veno court explained that even if the original hardships under-
taken by the employee had altered his employment status to that
of a for cause employee, such a contract's reasonable duration
would have "surely passed based on the consideration given" by
the time the he reached his eighth year of employment.' Given
these two cases, Pennsylvania courts seemingly should add
"length of employment" to their list of factors to consider when
determining the presence of sufficient additional consideration
because, under current Pennsylvania jurisprudence, the shorter
the length of employment between relocation and termination, the
more likely it is that the employee will be found to have provided
sufficient additional consideration.
Pennsylvania courts, and/or the legislature, need to provide a
concrete explanation of what exactly an employee must do, en-
dure, or refrain from doing in order to provide sufficient additional
consideration by means of suffering a substantial hardship. The
U.S. District Court, in Martin v. Safeguard Scientifics, Inc., 3
found that an employee who gave up goodwill and profit from his
proprietary business in order to work for his employer's firm pro-
vided sufficient additional consideration. However, just three
years earlier, the same court, in Duvall v. Polymer Corp., held that
giving up other job opportunities with different employers was not
enough of a hardship to justify a finding of sufficient additional
consideration. 132 Adding to the confusion in Pennsylvania case
law, prior to the Martin and Duvall decisions, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, in Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc. ," determined that
an employee provided sufficient additional consideration when he
agreed to work at sub-union wages in exchange for lifetime em-
ployment.' Given these three decisions, Pennsylvania employers
are not given sufficient judicial rules regarding their conduct in
order to avoid forming implied-in-fact contracts with their em-
ployees.
129. Shaffer, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013, at *18-20 (citing Cashdollar, 595 A.2d at 72,
and Veno, 515 A.2d at 580).
130. Veno, 515 A.2d at 580-81 n.4.
131. 17 F. Supp. 2d 357 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
132. 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14413, at *55-56 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
133. 526 A.2d 1192 (Pa. 1987).
134. In Greene, employee Greene formed an oral contract with his employer to work




In light of these inconsistent judicial decisions, the only clarifi-
cation that the Shaffer court offered, in interpreting Pennsylvania
law, was that courts "have given a narrow reading to 'additional
consideration,' generally requiring a showing of some extraordi-
nary detriment or extraordinary benefit before allowing the ques-
tion to reach the jury."'35 The court then held that Mr. Shaffer did
not meet the burden of proving sufficient additional consideration
because nothing in the record evidenced that his employer bene-
fited as a result of Mr. Shaffer's relocation: Mr. Shaffer himself
first proposed the move as a means of obtaining a better job; Mr.
Shaffer neither moved his family nor sold a home; and the em-
ployer actually provided notable additional benefits by giving Mr.
Shaffer a housing stipend, travel benefits, moving expenses, and
fringe benefits.'36 The court concluded that Mr. Shaffer simply
chose to vigorously pursue a professional and personal opportunity
and did not prove the requisite consideration to overcome the at-
will doctrine.'37
Although the determination in Shaffer clearly favored the em-
ployer, as Pennsylvania case law reveals, the facts and circum-
stances of other Pennsylvania cases are not always as clear-cut.
Thus, Pennsylvania courts must identify more precise guidelines
to use in determining what constitutes sufficient additional con-
sideration so that Pennsylvania, like so many other jurisdictions,
does not further erode the at-will employment presumption. Al-
ternatively, due to judicial indecision, many judges have suggested
that now is a key time for the legislature to become involved.
III. STATUS OF THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE IN OTHER SELECT
JURISDICTIONS
A. California
On the books, California is an at-will state.138 However, in prac-
tice, California courts have progressively eroded the at-will em-
ployment doctrine by carving out exceptions that restrict an em-
135. Shaffer, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14013, at *21 (quoting Geiger v. AT&T Corp., 962 F.
Supp. 637, 649 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).
136. Id. at *21.
137. Id.
138. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996). Section 2922 of the California
Labor Code states that "[a]n employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at
the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an
employment for a period greater than one month." Id. at § 2922.
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ployer's ability to freely terminate an employee without fear of
liability. Like Pennsylvania, California allows employees to over-
come the presumption of at-will employment by express agree-
ment,139 public policy exceptions,14 and statutory exceptions.14 '
These three exceptions, despite their ability to alter an at-will em-
ployment relationship into one for cause, are fairly routine, and do
not create much turmoil for courts, employers, and employees.
However, like Pennsylvania, California courts have also recog-
nized the implied-in-fact contract exception, which has greatly
impeded managerial discretion in the workplace, and has also cre-
ated much confusion among California courts.
When applying the implied-in-fact contract exception to em-
ployment cases, California courts consider the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" of the employment relationship in order to determine
whether the parties did indeed form an implied-in-fact contract.
4 3
In Foley, the California Supreme Court identified several factors
that may prove the existence of an implied agreement that termi-
nation is allowable only for cause. 44 Those factors include person-
nel policies, employer practices, industry practices, employee's
length of service, and assurances by the employer of continued
employment. 45 In identifying these factors, the court rationalized
that in employment cases, judiciaries need to determine the par-
ties' actual intent, and in order to do so, can examine the parties'
conduct.
46
Following Foley, the California Supreme Court decided Scott v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. ," 4' and significantly extended the im-
plied-in-fact contract exception to cover wrongful demotions in
addition to wrongful terminations. 148  The Scott court suggested
the modern trend in contract law is to reverse the presumption of
reliance on the written agreement toward evidence of experience
and practice. 149 In finding an implied agreement of termination for
139. See Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 (Cal. 2000).
140. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
141. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corporation, 765 P.2d 373, 376 n.4 (Cal. 1988).
142. In the 1980s, California courts decided 2 landmark cases, Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (overruled on other grounds), and Foley, 765
P.2d at 373, which applied the implied-in-fact contract exception to the employment arena.
143. See Pugh, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927, and Foley, 765 P.2d at 388.
144. Foley, 765 P.2d at 387.
145. Id. (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 385.
147. 904 P.2d 834 (Cal. 1995).
148. 904 P.2d 834 (Cal. 1995).
149. Scott, 904 P.2d at 834.
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cause, the Scott court reaffirmed the Foley court proposition that
"implied contractual terms 'ordinarily stand on equal footing with
express terms."' 150
Although Pugh, Foley, and Scott, advocate a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" approach, and identify a seemingly straight-forward
standard for determining the existence of an implied-in-fact con-
tract, California courts have struggled to uniformly apply this
guideline. In fact, California case law is inconsistent, 1 ' and courts
appear uncertain as to whether at-will disclaimers in employment
manuals and handbooks, oral assurances of job security and con-
tinued employment, performance appraisals, promotions, salary
increase, and a combination of some or all of these factors are
enough to transform an at-will relationship into one for cause. In
fact, these contradictory holdings have even led Judge Kozinski, of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, to reflect that the once simple
presumption of at-will employment has been replaced by burden-
some trials and discovery, has created endless and insurmount-
able confusion among judges and juries, and has withered away to
a "hollow legal fiction."52
Much of the problem stems from the fact that despite the stated
resolve to abide by traditional contract law, California courts are
veering from this goal.'53 For instance, although contract law
mandates that parties manifest an intent to be bound by an
150. Id at 838-39 (quoting Foley, 765 P.2d at 385).
151. See Wayte v. Rollins Int'l, Inc., 215 Cal. Rptr. 59, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (in wrong-
ful discharge action, evidence of employer's repeated assurances over six years that em-
ployee's work was satisfactory was sufficient to raise inference that employee was wrong-
fully terminated in violation of an implied-in-fact promise that he would only be discharged
for cause); Harlan v. Sohio Petroleum Company, 677 F. Supp. 1021, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(in plaintiff's action for breach of contract and wrongful discharge, court denied defendant
employer's summary judgment motion because evidence that defendant made oral assur-
ances about job security to plaintiff during recruitment raised genuine issue of material
fact of whether employer's discharge of plaintiff was wrongful breach of an implied promise
not to terminate except for good cause); Miller v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Cal. Rptr. 56,
59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (court affirmed trial court's grant of summary judgment for em-
ployer in wrongful discharge action and held that mere promotions and salary increases
during eleven years of service were natural occurrences of employment relationships insuf-
ficient to raise the inference of an implied-in-fact contract); and Tollefson v. Roman Catho-
lic Bishop, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (summary judgment for employer in
wrongful discharge action was proper where employer and employee had express one-year
agreement with no obligation for renewal, holding terms of written agreement cannot be
changed through evidence of long service, prior contract renewals, and absence of poor
performance evaluations).
152. See Kern v. Levolor Lorentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 783 (9th Cir. 1990) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
153. See Julia Barnhart, The Implied-In-Fact Contract Exception to At-Will Employment:
A Call for Reform, 45 UCLA L. REV. 817-18 (1998).
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agreement, courts are confused as to what factors demonstrate
intent.5 4 Certainly, deciphering what the parties intended is no
easy task, especially since the Foley court explained that contrac-
tual understanding need not be overt but can arise from the con-
duct of the parties."" However, a significant discrepancy results
when some California courts find that parties expressed the requi-
site contractual intent solely due to employer praise and promo-
tion in response to satisfactory employee performance, while oth-
ers require these factors in addition to many more considerations.
Consequently, California employers do not know how to protect
themselves from impliedly entering into for cause employment
relationships. California courts insist on examining the "totality
of the circumstances," and as a result, at-will disclaimers in em-
ployment handbooks and manuals provide little protection.
However, in recent years, a few California cases significantly
eliminated past confusion by enunciating what steps an employer
can take to ensure that at-will remains the rule in the workplace.
For instance, regardless of the fact that California courts insist on
considering the "totality of the circumstances," the California Su-
preme Court in Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.,"' clarified the total-
ity of the circumstances analysis as not implying "that every
vague combination of Foley factors, shaken together in a bag, nec-
essarily allows a finding that the employee had a right to be dis-
charged only for good cause, as determined in court.""7 Addition-
ally, the Guz court pointed out that most cases applying California
law, both pre- and post-Foley, have held that "an at-will provision
in an express written agreement signed by the employee, cannot
be overcome by proof of an implied contrary understanding.""
The Guz court observed, quite favorably for employers, that many
of the post-Foley cases have not allowed a finding of termination
for cause based solely on evidence of duration of service, regular
promotions, favorable performance reviews, praise from supervi-
sors, and salary increases."9  Rather, these events are merely
"natural consequences" of a properly functioning work environ-
ment.6 ° The Guz court also noted that transforming at-will rela-
154. See Barnhart, supra note 141, at 818.
155. Foley, 765 P.2d at 387.
156. 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000).
157. Guz, 8 P.3d at 1101.
158. Id. at 1103.




tionships into ones terminable only for cause, based solely on suc-
cessful longevity, would hinder the retention and promotion of
employees.161
In order to create a for cause employment relationship, the em-
ployer must communicate that seniority and longevity create
rights against termination at-will."2 Length of employment was a
significant factor in Foley, but the repeated assurances of job secu-
rity were the prominent conduct that led the Court to find for the
employee.'63 California employers, based on Guz, can protect
themselves from inadvertently entering into implied contracts
with their employees by minding their words and actions.
As an additional protection for employers, the United States
District Court, in Salsgiver v. America Online Inc.,"6 noted that
"an implied-in-fact contract requiring cause for termination is
fundamentally inconsistent with an express at-will contract, and
the terms of the express contract cannot be rewritten by implica-
tions arising from later conduct."'65 Thus, there cannot be both an
express contract and implied contract when each requires differ-
ent results. Express terms are controlling, even if not a part of an
integrated employment contract.1
6
Courts will examine the "totality of the circumstances" and ter-
mination for cause may be found in a particular case where the
evidence of an implied contract outweighs the presumption of at-
will employment. However, in accordance with the courts' much
more careful application of the implied-in-fact contract exception,
an express contract that articulates the at-will policy will not be
trumped by evidence of an implied agreement.
The courts' recent assurance that California employers can pre-
serve at-will relationships by forming express agreements with
their employees may lead to questioning whether California truly
is an at-will state because employers are required to take affirma-
tive precautions to preserve the at-will rule. Additionally, em-
ployees may not enthusiastically agree to enter into express con-
tracts that give their employers unbridled power to terminate
them on a whim.
161. Id. at 1104-05.
162. See Guz, 8 P.3d at 1104-05.
163. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 387-88.
164. 147 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D.C. Cal. 2000).
165. Salsgiver, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1029.




The current trend in California case law, to apply the implied-
in-fact contract exception to the employment context in only very
limited circumstances, is much more favorable to employers than
past judicial decisions. However, given the long history of confu-
sion among California judges, a limited application of the implied-
in-fact contract exception or continued erosion of the at-will doc-
trine are both equally possible in the future.
The fact that California case law has evolved to the point where
employers must take extra steps to ensure that the at-will rule
governs their workplaces exemplifies why the Pennsylvania legis-
lature must establish clear guidelines for the application of the
implied-in-fact contract exception. If action is not soon taken in
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania employers, similarly to California
employers, might have to go to great lengths to reverse the dam-
age done by a liberal application of the implied-in-fact contract
exception.
B. New Jersey
Like both Pennsylvania and California, New Jersey also recog-
nizes an implied-in-fact contract exception to the at-will rule. '67
New Jersey especially merits discussion because it was one of the
first jurisdictions to cause extreme damage to the at-will rule by
means of the implied-in-fact contract exception.
In Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.,168 the employer gave his
employee an employment handbook, shortly after he began work-
ing for the employer, that spelled out the grounds for discharge
and procedures for the employer to follow to discharge an em-
ployee. 9 Subsequently, the employee argued that his employer
breached an implied-in-fact contract because he veered from the
grounds and procedures for termination that were codified in the
handbook.'
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in the employee's favor. 7'
The court held that the mere act of distributing a handbook was
highly significant because the handbook discussed job security, a
topic of great concern to employees. 172 The court reasoned that
167. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (modified, 499 A.2d 515
(N.J. 1985)).
168. Woolley, 491 A-2d at 1258.
169. Id. at 1271-73.
170. Id. at 1258.




employees could understandably view the handbook as creating a
legally binding obligation.' 3 Thus, the Woolley court determined
that by distributing an employment handbook, the employer
makes an offer for a unilateral contract, which the employee ac-
cepts when he remains on the job.' 4 Further, the court concluded
that the employee provides consideration for the unilateral con-
tract by continuing to work despite no legal obligation to do so.175
As one critic has observed, by formulating the unilateral con-
tract analysis in Woolley, the New Jersey Supreme Court fash-
ioned a model for other jurisdictions that base their implied-in-fact
contract exceptions on a traditional contract analysis.'76 Further,
by holding that an employer can alter his at-will relationship with
his employee simply by distributing a handlbook, New Jersey has
markedly eroded the at-will doctrine because the Woolley court did
not evaluate the employer's intent or, like California courts, exam-
ine the "totality of the circumstances." Rather, the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that the mere act of distribution alone cre-
ates legal consequences for the parties. Thus, Pennsylvania
should view this sister state's decision as a warning to steer clear
of this path in order to avoid completely obliterating the at-will
doctrine.
C. Michigan
Like New Jersey, Michigan has also eroded the at-will employ-
ment doctrine by means of the implied-in-fact contract excep-
tion.'77 Of special significance, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield,7 8 the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the implied-in-
fact contract exception is grounded in general notions of equity.'
79
In Toussaint, the employer distributed a handbook to his employ-
ees, which explained various termination procedures and prom-
ised that the employer would discharge employees only for just
cause. 8 ' Subsequently, an employee who was discharged without
173. Woolley, 491 A-2d at 1265-66.
174. Id. at 1264-66.
175. Id.
176. See Shaughnessy, supra note 5, at 1077.
177. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
178. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
179. See Shaughnessy, supra note 5, at 1075.
180. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 893.
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cause brought a claim against the employer for wrongful termina-
tion.""
The Michigan Supreme Court, in finding for the employee, es-
tablished that the at-will doctrine was a rule of construction,
rather than a rule of substantive law.'82 Further, the court de-
clared that contractual rights can arise from statements in em-
ployee handbooks.'83 The Toussaint court held that contractual
rights may arise although neither party signs the statement of
policy; the employer can unilaterally amend the policy without
notifying the employee; and the handbook makes no specific refer-
ence to a particular employee. 1"4
The court did not specifically explain these contractual rights
found in handbooks, but concluded that by making promises of job
security, the employer could gain an "orderly, cooperative and
loyal work force."1" The court reasoned that because the employer
ultimately benefits from this arrangement, the handbook should
be interpreted in accordance with the employee's reasonable ex-
pectations.'86
These bold statements by the Michigan Supreme Court, similar
to those of the New Jersey Supreme Court, signaled one of the
first great assaults on the at-will doctrine by means of the im-
plied-in-fact contract exception.87 Subsequently, other jurisdic-
tions looked to the examples set by Michigan and New Jersey to
develop a body of law that significantly protects non-union, pri-
vate-sector employees from arbitrary or bad-faith discharge.'
IV. CONCLUSION
By studying how other states have eroded the at-will doctrine,
the Pennsylvania Legislature must realize that now is the time to
act before Pennsylvania courts make the same mistakes as made
in sister jurisdictions. Pennsylvania can learn great lessons from
California, a state that applied the implied-in-fact contract excep-
tion much too liberally in recent decades and now must desper-
181. Id. at 883.
182. Id. at 885.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 892.
185. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
186. Id. at 893.
187. See generally Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding
the Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 732 (1991).
188. See Shaughnessy, supra note 5, at 1077.
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ately try to limit the breadth of the exception in order to eliminate
contradiction in case law. Additionally, Pennsylvania can benefit
by reviewing how both New Jersey and Michigan have severely
limited employer discretion in the workplace by holding that mere
distribution of an employee handbook can create legally binding
consequences for the parties.
Thus, as the Pennsylvania judiciary has often suggested, the
Pennsylvania legislature should set forth specific guidelines for
applying the exceptions to the long-standing at-will employment
doctrine, and should provide clear examples of what circumstances
justify application of the exceptions. Uniform standards should be
set forth that explain the circumstances under which an implied-
in-fact contract can arise in the employment context, as well as
what constitutes sufficient additional consideration. These guide-
lines are necessary in order to preserve managerial discretion in
the workplace and to ensure that employers know how to conduct
themselves in order to avoid inadvertently forming for-cause em-
ployment relationships with their employees. Until such policies
are established, the only assurance that employers can rely on is
the arguably hollow echo of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
repeated assertion that Pennsylvania is an at-will state.
Amy M. Carlson
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